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Abstract 
Passing the Turing Test is not a sensible goal for 
Artificial Intelligence. Adherence to Turing's vision 
from 1950 is now actively harmful to our field. We 
review problems with Turing's idea, and suggest 
that, ironically, the very cognitive science that he 
tried to create must reject his research goal. 
1 Introduction 
Alan Turing was one of the greatest scientists of this century. 
His paper [1950], "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" 
inspired the creation of our field, giving it a vision, a 
philosophical charter and its first great challenge, the Turing 
Test. 
The Turing Test has been with AI since its inception, and 
has always partly defined the field. Some AI pioneers seriously 
adopted it as a long-range goal, and some long-standing 
research programs are still guided by it; for others it has 
come to provide more of a vision to define and motivate the 
whole field. For example, in his recent text, Ginsberg [1993] 
defines AI as "the enterprise of constructing a physical symbol 
system that can reliably pass the Turing Test." 
Passing the Turing Test is now often understood to mean 
something like "making an artificial intelligence," without 
paying too much attention to the details. In this article, 
however, we will take Turing seriously. We do not think he 
was being merely metaphorical or speaking in some loose, 
inspirational way. He seems to have been suggesting the 
imitation game as a definite goal for a program of research. 
It was supposed to be a concrete and relatively well-defined 
goal and hence to avoid the philosophical quagmire that 
Turing (correctly) predicted would result from debates about 
whether a computer could properly be described as 
"intelligent." 
But taken this seriously, we will argue, it is no longer a 
useful idea. The Turing Test had a historical role in getting 
AI started, but it is now a burden to the field, damaging its 
public reputation and its own intellectual coherence. We must 
explicitly reject the Turing Test in order to find a more 
mature description of our goals; it is time to move it from 
the textbooks to the history books. 
2 Head Games 
As the reader probably knows, the Turing Test comprises an 
imitation game which involves a man, a woman, and a judge, 
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all communicating (but unable to see one another) in a three-
way conversation. (The sex of the judge is not specified, and 
we will use "he" for reasons purely of grammatical simplicity,) 
The immediate task of the judge is to decide which of the 
other two is the woman, and the task of each of the players 
is to persuade the judge that he or she is the woman and that 
the other is the man. Thus, the game is a test of the ability of 
a man to pretend to be a woman, and of a woman to resist 
being judged a man. To make the game more exact, Turing 
proposes to use an average score over many conversations 
and to limit the length of each conversation to, say, 10 minutes. 
Turing then simply says that we should try to make a machine 
which could successfully "take the place of a man" in this 
game 70% of the time. 
Turing is usually understood to mean that the game should 
be played with the question of gender (e.g., being female) 
replaced by the question of species (e.g., being human), so 
that the judge is faced with the task of differentiating a 
human participant from a machine pretending to be human. 
We will call this the species test. 
However, Turing does not mention any change to the rules 
of the imitation game, and there is no need to interpret him 
as meaning to do so. If we take him at his word, the test is 
rather clever. It has a woman and a machine each trying to 
convince the judge that they are a woman, and the judge's 
task is still to decide which is the woman and which, therefore, 
is not. But this judge is not thinking about the differences 
between women and machines, but between women and men. 
The hypothesis that one of his subjects is not human is not 
even in his natural space of initial possibilities. This judge 
has exactly the same problem to solve as a judge in the 
original imitation game and could be expected to bring the 
same attitudes and skills to the problem. We will call this 
the gender test.
2 
There are some standard objections to Turing Tests in 
either version. For example, they seem likely to be extremely 
difficult: so difficult, indeed, that someone who declared 
one as his immediate research goal would now probably not 
be taken seriously. They ignore or sidestep many aspects of 
1 Ruling out vision avoids such complexities as skill in cross-
dressing; but in any case Turing thought that machine vision 
was likely to be very difficult and was irrelevant to the goal of 
his project. 
2 Judith Genova [1994] argues similarly. We use her 
'species/gender' terminology. 
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too closely bound up with natural language understanding to 
now be a beacon for the entire field. These are familiar 
objections, but there are deeper ones. The imitation game 
itself has some basic design flaws, which are inherited by 
any version of the Turing Test. Later, we will argue that AI 
should not be defined as an imitation of human abilities in 
any case. 
3 On Not Detecting Anything 
One of the first lessons learned by a graduate student in 
psychology is never to design an experiment to detect nothing. 
This is such a fundamental error that it has been given a 
title: confirming the null hypothesis. It is impossible either 
to completely define the experimental conditions (how hard 
should one look for the thing that might not be there?) or to 
come to a firm conclusion (what if one had looked harder, 
or differently?). The imitation game is precisely such a design, 
in which a difference between two behaviors is what isn't 
being detected. Assume for a moment that one accepts the 
Turing Test as valid: if an artificial intelligence could reliably 
pass a given instantiation of the test, it would have 
demonstrated either that its intelligence was genuine or that 
the judge was not clever enough to ask sufficiently telling 
questions. But this raises the problem of what exactly are 
the telling questions? Ironically then, the issue that the Turing 
Test was supposed to avoid remains in force: would it be an 
adequate criterion for intelligence? 
The imitation game conditions say nothing about the judge, 
but the success of the game depends crucially on how clever, 
knowledgeable, and insightful the judge is. A clever judge 
will be looking out for subtle signs of femininity. For example, 
sociolinguistic studies by Robin Lakoff have shown that adult 
American women tend to use a wider range of color words 
than men do. A woman will typically distinguish crimson 
and scarlet, where a man will usually describe them simply 
as red, a word which many adult women regard as ambiguous. 
A good imitation-game judge would know this and be alert 
for this sign of womanhood; and therefore, a successful player 
must also be expected to know it, and use it. And of course 
this applies to any other detectable sexual differences in 
word usage. But how many such differences are there? The 
question will always be a matter for research. The imitation 
game does not have a stable endpoint. 
The zero-sum competitive design of Turing's game has 
more odd consequences. It would not be enough simply to 
exhibit female use of color words, for example. If a female 
player notices her opponent (whom she knows to be male) 
using words like "puce" or "magenta," she might challenge 
him to engage in an explicit debate about color to test his 
knowledge and explicitly draw the judge's attention to such 
attempts to mislead, and a male player would need to able to 
deal with this. To be a successful player it would not be 
sufficient simply to have, and therefore exhibit the linguistic 
symptoms of, a feminine attitude to color; one would have 
to consciously know of those symptoms and use this 
knowledge in tactical planning. To be successful at the 
imitation game, one would have to be thinking all the time 
about techniques of female impersonation. 
Note that such conscious strategic use of sociolinguistics 
is quite different from exhibiting a symptom of some 
underlying cognitive difference. Some writers have objected 
to such things as an implemented model of female use of 
color vocabulary on the grounds that any such model involving 
"knowledge representation" can be only understood as 
modeling conscious thought. The difference between 
someone who, quite unwittingly, uses a rich color vocabulary 
and someone who consciously uses knowledge of 
sociolinguistics to improve his or her imitation game 
performance provides a vivid illustration of the necessary 
distinction. 
Another problem with null-effect experiments is that they 
cannot measure anything. The imitation game can test only 
for complete success. A man who failed to seem feminine 
in, say, 10% of what he said would almost always fail the 
imitation game: to pass, one has to be totally convincing 
almost all the time. This is a criticism of these tests not only 
as a guide to research—they provide no way to measure 
partial progress toward the goal—but also of the goal itself. 
Even in humans we recognize the possibility that an 
intellectual talent need not correlate with conversational skill 
or debating ability; but using any kind of imitation game as 
our research goal denies this simple insight and declares that 
we must strive to create a fully human-like collection of 
abilities, organized to succeed in winning an argument. 
4 Turing Test Problems 
All of these criticisms apply directly to the Turing Tests. 
This is what we would have to make our program able to 
do: not talk like a human because it thinks like a human, or 
even talk like a woman because it thinks like a woman, but 
rather to talk like a woman as a result of thinking about how 
best to talk like a woman. The gender test is not a test of 
making an artificial human, but of making a mechanical 
transvestite. 
Our point here, to emphasize, is not a moral one; rather it 
is concerned with what the program would have to be thinking 
about in order to be successful in these artificial games. 
Human players would also be forced into these artificial 
frames of mind, which arise simply from the tactical pressures 
of the games themselves. For example, to succeed at the 
species test, a machine must not just pass as human, it must 
succeed in persuading the judge that its human opponent is a 
machine. To do this would require more than ordinary 
conversational abilities. The competitive nature of this test 
makes it essential that the machine give a human-like 
impression in every possible way and be alert for any way in 
which its opponent might seem mechanical. To pass this 
test, a machine would have to not just give a human-like 
impression, but also be an expert on making a good impression, 
be always aware of the impression it was giving, and be 
ready to defend itself against accusations of giving the wrong 
impression. It would have to take care not to exhibit any 
inhuman talents which it might have; it would have to always 
cleverly lie, cheat, and dissemble. The winner of the Loebner 
competition, for example, sometimes deliberately "mistyped" 
a word, then backspaced to correct it at human typing speed. 
This strategy is clever, but surely such tricks should not be 
central to our subject. To pass the species test we must make 
not an artificial intelligence, but an artificial con artist. 
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of the imitation game in the difficulty of obtaining an unbiased 
judge. The general perception of what are essentially human 
talents keeps shifting. As AI progresses and more and more 
tasks previously considered to involve human abilities are 
performed by machines, a judge in the naive Turing Test 
will gain more and more subtle ways of detecting the behavior 
of nonhuman machines, just as a skilled doctor will become 
more adept at recognizing subtle symptoms. Three hundred 
years ago, when Pascal described his "calculator," (a machine 
roughly similar to an automobile odometer), European 
academics were astonished that a machine could perform 
arithmetic, an intellectual ability that only few humans 
possessed. Even as late as the second world war, when Turing 
was working, the ability to perform complex mental 
calculations rapidly was considered evidence of intellectual 
talent, found useful throughout science and engineering, and 
given academic recognition. The ability to perform 
simultaneous translation may soon be reduced to the "merely 
mechanical." 
When Eliza first appeared, some people found its 
conversational abilities quite human-like. No machine until 
then could have reacted even in such a simple way to what 
had been said to it. But during the Loebner competition, 
many programs were instantly revealed as nonhuman 
precisely by the first hint of resemblance of their behavior to 
that of Eliza. Amusingly, the boundary shifts in both 
directions. Some judges in the Loebner competition rated a 
human as a machine on the grounds that she produced 
extended, well-written paragraphs of informative text, which 
is now apparently considered to be an inhuman ability in 
parts of our culture. The Loebner competition illustrates very 
clearly how the imitation game inevitably slides from a 
concern with cognitive status to being a test of the ability of 
the human species to discriminate its members from 
mechanical imposters. 
Turing Tests suffer from another flaw: it is not clear what 
exactly they can be failing to detect. While Turing was careful 
to not suggest the test as a definition of humanity or 
intelligence, the fact that it is often described that way is 
revealing. Let us say that a Turing Test is a test of "human 
conversational competence." But what is that, exactly? The 
only answer is the ability to pass the corresponding Turing 
Test. The tests are circular: they define the qualities they are 
claiming to be evidence for. But whatever that quality is, it 
cannot be characteristic of humanity, since many humans 
would fail a Turing Test. Since one of the players must be 
judged to be a machine, half the human population would 
fail the species test. 
5 Inhuman Intelligence 
These have all been criticisms of the design of Turing's test 
considered as some kind of experiment. One might argue, 
however, that it should be regarded more as a spur to 
technological progress, much as the goal of getting a man on 
the moon was undertaken to spur the development of the US 
space program. However, we will argue that using this test 
to define our field, even loosely, now leads the field to 
disown and reject its own successes. 
Notice first how parochial, one might even say arrogant, a 
perspective is assumed by the imitation game. Why should 
we take it as our goal to build something which is just like 
us? A dog would never win any imitation game; but there 
seems to be no doubt that dogs exhibit cognition, and a 
machine with the cognitive and communicative abilities of a 
dog would be an interesting challenge for AI (and might 
usefully be incorporated, for example, into automobiles.) 
Likewise, the species detection aspect of the Turing Test 
has served to focus much AI research on those facets of 
human behavior which are least susceptible to useful 
generalization precisely because they are not shared by other 
species (silicon-based or otherwise). As we develop a general 
science of cognition, it is the aspects of human thought which 
are not distinctively human that seem the most fundamental. 
As others have emphasized, cognitive science is a science of 
cognition, not particularly of human cognition; but we cannot 
expect to be able to understand human cognition without 
first having a firm grasp of the basic principles of cognition: 
From a practical perspective, why would anyone want to 
build machines that could pass the Turing Test? As many 
have observed, there is no shortage of humans, and we already 
have well-proven ways of making more of them. Human 
cognition, even high-quality human cognition, is not in short 
supply. What extra functionality would such a machine 
provide, even if we could build it? 
One answer is that if we could make a human intelligence 
then we could make a superhuman intelligence just by getting 
a better processor and extra memory. This vision—the HAL 
vision of AI—is cited by several AI pioneers (e.g., McCarthy, 
Feigenbaum, Minsky) and by many people who are worried 
about what these superintelligences might do. But if we 
abandon the Turing Test vision, the goal naturally shifts 
from making artificial supcrhumans which can replace us, to 
making superhumanly intelligent artifacts which we can use 
to amplify and support our own cognitive abilities, just as 
people use hydraulic power to amplify their muscular abilities. 
This is in fact occurring, of course, and has been clearly 
forseen and articulated by others; our point here is only to 
emphasize how different this goal is from the one that Turing 
left us with. AI should play a central role in this exciting 
new technology, but to do so it must turn its back on Turing's 
dream. 
The area generally called "expert systems" has been hugely 
successful as a technology but is widely perceived, both in 
the academic community and in the commercial marketplace, 
as having somehow failed to achieve its goal. The systems 
produced are often described as "brittle," for example, which 
is a way of saying that they perform only in their intended 
domain. That it only performs its intended task would hardly 
be considered a criticism of most machines, however; and 
we suggest that it seems a valid criticism here solely because 
of the lingering influence of the Turing Test measure of AI 
success. Specialized AI systems are sometimes criticized as 
being "idiot savants"; but if we abandon the goal of making 
artificial people, we can rejoice in making useful idiot savants. 
3 The worries seem to arise from the idea that the superhuman 
intelligence would not just be smart, but would also have 
superhuman political ambition and be vulnerable to human 
moral temptation. This might indeed be unwise, but not even 
the imitation game requires this. 
974 INVITED SPEAKERS The authors look forward happily to having several such 
idiots for lawn mowing, tax preparation, etc... We are not 
here simply reiterating the widespread "hype" complaint that 
AI has promised too much and found itself unable to deliver. 
In this area, in fact, AI systems have delivered the goods 
very well, sometimes spectacularly well. But even this success 
is often somehow sicklied over with the pale cast of Turing 
Test insufficiency. 
Low fidelity simulations of human behavior are quite a 
different goal from systems which complement, surpass, and 
extend our cognitive attributes. The Turing Test does not 
admit of weaker, different, or even stronger forms of 
intelligence than those deemed human. This puts AI 
engineering in a rather ridiculous position. Our most useful 
computer applications (including Al programs) are often 
valuable exactly by virtue of their lack of humanity. A truly 
human-like program would be nearly useless. 
One can detect a trend in the marketplace in which instead 
of selling "intelligence," even a limited version of it called 
"expertise," engineers are incorporating what might be called 
cognitive functionality into products whose overall behavior 
would often not be thought of as particularly intelligent. As 
AI progresses, we become able to make computers do more 
and more things, and some of these would be regarded as 
requiring intelligence—or at any rate cognitive ability of 
some kind—if a human did them. But this functionality is 
not made into a special category called "AI ability," or taken 
to the market as anything having to do with human beings. 
In fact, the AI is often quite invisible in the final product. 
There are cameras, copiers, televisions, automobiles, battery 
rechargers and laptop operating systems all with algorithms 
incorporated into them which use AI ideas and techniques, 
but they are not usually advertised as "intelligent" or "expert." 
They certainly could not pass a Turing Test and there is no 
particular reason to suppose that they represent an application 
of a part or component of something that might one day pass 
a Turing Test. The designers of these systems construe AI as 
an enabling technology, and reject the Turing Test as a 
criterion for success. The influence of the Turing Test vision 
is so pervasive, however, that such work is often not called 
artificial intelligence just for this reason. This is a tragedy 
for Al. Our subject is fuelling technical revolutions and 
changing the world, but Turing's ghost orders us to disinherit 
these successes. 
One is not going to get something which can pass the 
Turing Test by eventually assembling a collection of these 
techniques. It would be both far too good and far too bad. It 
would be lightning-fast and superhumanly accomplished in 
some ways, curiously inept in others. We could find ways of 
disguising its inhuman talents, of course; Turing considers 
this kind of problem explicitly, observing that a machine 
can always pretend to be worse at arithmetic than it really is. 
But if one's aim is to provide better machines for people to 
use, what a silly business to get involved in! It is like gluing 
a beak and feathers onto an airplane to make it look more 
like a bird. 
6 On Computational Wings 
This flight metaphor is quite precise and worth pursuing in 
more detail. Early attempts to make flying machines often 
did things like attaching a beak onto the front, or trying to 
make a wing which would flap like a bird's wing (This 
extraordinarily persistent idea is found in Leonardo's 
notebooks and in a textbook on airplane design published in 
1911). It is easy for us to smile at such naivete, but one 
should realize that it made good sense at the time. What 
birds did was incredible, and nobody really knew how they 
did it. It always seemed to involve feathers and flapping. 
Maybe the beak was critical for stability. When one's 
ignorance was almost total, it made good sense to copy as 
much of the natural thing as one could, if only to find out 
what aspects were essential and which were not. A few 
hundred years ago the idea of artificial flight could have 
been defined—indeed, often was so characterized—as the 
idea of making a machine that could fly like a bird. Birds 
were the only available exemplars for flight then, just as 
humans were the only exemplars for cognition when Turing 
was writing. The Turing Test version of artificial flight is 
just that: make a machine which would be indistinguishable 
from a bird, if all you could see of it was how it flew. This 
bird making was the goal of artificial flight for centuries. 
Most early attempts to make gliders copied aspects of bird 
structure. As late as 1880, Lielenthal's pioneering experiments 
with man-carrying gliders used wings and tails clearly based 
on bird anatomy, and a US patent was issued at the turn of 
the century for a "flying suit" with wing-linkages covered 
with feathers. 
But progress was actually made when this aim of imitating 
nature was abandoned. The technology of flight advanced 
rapidly once workers gave themselves clearly-defined 
functional goals, separated from any notion of imitating 
biology, and strove to achieve these goals by any means 
available. The Wright brothers clearly separated the problems 
of power-to-weight ratio, lift, lateral stability, pitch and yaw 
control and solved them one at a time, using such unnatural 
devices as box kites, launch catapults and vertical fin surfaces. 
The first successful flyers were very unlike birds, and did 
not fly like birds. Likewise, the new science of aerodynamics 
made rapid progress only once it had artifacts with which to 
perform controlled experiments. The idea of the airfoil (which 
is crucial to the performance of all birds except the 
hummingbirds) was not discovered in nature. The shape of 
real bird wings is far too complex and flexible to suggest the 
idea of the airfoil; but once it had been discovered by 
experiments with artificial flyers, and its basic role understood 
from theory, a gull's wing can easily be recognized as one. 
Birds are incredibly efficient and clever flyers, and 
aeronautical engineers still look to them for inspiration; but 
this productive interaction between technology and biology 
did not come about by the engineers taking as their goal the 
task of imitating nature. Indeed, it happened as a direct result 
of abandoning that naive notion and seeking instead to identify 
general principles of stable flight and create machines based 
on them. Similar things are happening now in cognitive 
science where computational ideas originating in AI are being 
successfully applied in cognitive psychology, linguistics, and 
neuroscience. 
Artificial flight both transcends and lags far behind natural 
flight, just as AI machines both surpass and lag behind human 
intelligence. Airplanes fly at Mach 3, miles above the clouds; 
but we doubt if an airplane will ever be able to land on the 
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Machines can't lay eggs, of course, but even if we restrict 
ourselves to matters of flying, birds have talents that will 
probably always escape technology. No aircraft will pass the 
Turing Test for flight. 
Perhaps human conversation will always be beyond 
computer abilities in its complexity and subtlety. If so, we 
should not think that AI has failed, even if the aim of our 
science is to understand intelligence and of our technology 
to amplify and extend it. Neither of them should be trying to 
reproduce it. That is unnecessary for the science and 
insufficient for the technology. 
Even if one's primary goal is essentially psychological, to 
understand human intelligence, attempting to build a replica 
of a human is not a sensible approach. But there is no reason 
why AI, or more generally cognitive science, should define 
itself in terms of human intelligence or cognition. While this 
was a natural way to begin, just as flight pioneers began by 
trying to imitate bird wings, the science itself provides 
explanations for cognition which deny the uniqueness of 
any biologically defined categories. Its general insights and 
ideas apply equally well to electronic computers as to nervous 
systems, much as aerodynamics applies equally well to airflow 
over a metal wing as to one covered with feathers. This is 
not a new observation, but we have only recently begun to 
understand the extent to which it implies a rejection of 
imitation-game criteria for success in AI, and how pervasive 
the consequences of these criteria are. 
7 Turing's Ghost 
Two venerable intellectual threads weave through history 
and converge on Alan Turing. To his great credit he grasped 
them and started knitting what has become the rich tapestry 
of motivations and ideas that comprise AI. One thread is the 
idea that machines might somehow process meanings, which 
runs through Hobbes, Pascal, Leibniz, Boole, Babbage, and 
many others. The other is the ancient ambition, which is 
probably older than civilization, to steal divine power by 
making something come alive. It is reflected, for example, 
in the Greek myth of Pygmalion, the Golem legend, and the 
Frankenstein story. Turing was perhaps the first person to be 
in a position to see how these ancient themes might be brought 
together. Whether or not he intended it, his insight that 
technology might, at long last, be able to reach a kind of 
divine power almost certainly played a key role in motivating 
early AI projects. Viewed in this historical context, Turing's 
suggestion of an imitation game seems more understandable; 
but the same historical view suggests strongly that we must 
now distinguish legend from science. AI is the proud heir of 
Boole, Babbage, and Turing, but not of Mary Shelley. 
We suspect that several subfields of AI have tended to 
reject their association with their parent precisely because 
they found it necessary to develop methodologies which are 
inconsistent with any kind of Turing Test. Vision, for example, 
is a perfectly well defined area of scientific investigation or 
technological ambition within which one can work without 
feeling obliged to also thereby accept a larger goal of creating 
a complete intelligent machine. Just as the Turing Tests allow 
for no degree of partial success, the research programs they 
define cannot be sensibly taken apart into subfields without 
an implicit agreement to conform to some kind of grand 
intellectual architecture, which is not a reasonable constraint 
to put on either a science or a technology. Turing's legacy 
alienates maturing subfields with methodological 
inconsistencies. Abandoning the Turing test as an ultimate 
goal is almost a requirement for any rational research program 
which declares itself interested in any particular part of 
cognition or mental ability. Let us emphasize again, we do 
not deny the need for this abandonment. The harm is done 
when this is perceived as abandoning AI. 
Allowing our field to be defined by a Turing Test also 
harms its reputation, in direct and subtle ways. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, many lay critics of AI assume the field to be 
defined by Turing's goal, and by this light it does not seem 
to be doing very well. For just one example, Frederick Allen, 
writing in The Atlantic' [ 1994]: 
Today traditional artificial intelligence, or AI, is a 
backwater at best, and the confidence with which it 
was once pursued seems unimaginable. Nobody has 
ever designed a program that can converse at all 
convincingly on a single subject, and the field has 
splintered into disparate parts The grand vision 
has nearly vanished. 
Such a pessimistic summary of a flourishing research area 
like ours may seem merely to reflect ignorance. But if one 
identifies AI with the goal of passing a Turing Test—the 
"grand vision" to which Allen refers—then he is perfectly 
correct. The mistake lies in allowing that identification. 
Another much-cited attack on AI may arise in part from 
an insight into the Turing Test. As we have emphasized, in 
order to succeed at the imitation game even a human player 
would be obliged to think consciously, to an unnatural extent, 
about what effects his utterances might be having on a listener. 
It is quite natural to go from this insight to Searle's idea that 
AI programs can be only a simulation of cognition, leading 
to his notorious distinction between strong and weak AI. 
The Turing Test indeed challenges a computer to simulate a 
woman, rather than be one. 
Finally, perhaps the most subtle kind of damage which the 
Turing Test has done to AI is by limiting its sights. Ironically, 
Turing's daring vision may in fact be too restrictive. All 
versions of the Turing Test are based on a massively 
anthropocentric view of the nature of intelligence. Turing 
correctly insisted that his test was not meant to define 
intelligence. Nevertheless, in giving us this touchstone of 
success, he chose human intelligence—in fact, even more 
peculiarly, the arguing skill of the educated English middle 
class in playing a kind of party game—as our goal. But the 
very science which Turing directed us towards provides a 
perspective from which a much broader and more satisfying 
account of intelligence is emerging. The Turing Test focuses 
our attention on the most human details of behavior, rather 
than general computational principles of cognition. 
8 What Is AI? 
AI has always wondered how to define itself, and has engaged 
in a long-running territorial battle with other parts of computer 
science. Techniques are often developed in AI and later 
absorbed into mainstream computer science. Unlike most 
subdisciplines of computer science, AI seems to be defined 
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4 
So, which parts of computer science are part of AI? We 
suggest a rather radical answer to this question: all of them. 
AI is not a part of computer science in the way that compiler 
design, object-oriented programming or genetic algorithms 
are. AI is the business of using computation to make machines 
act more intelligently, or to somehow amplify human 
intelligence. It is not a particular collection of methods, or a 
programming style. Any technique can be used by a program 
to do something intelligent, or to display a cognitive ability. 
Until perhaps a decade ago many computational methods 
were pioneered in AI or in close association with it. One of 
the first compilers was reported at a meeting on intelligent 
machines. Larry Tesler has suggested that AI be defined to 
be the part of computer science where things don't work 
properly yet; the edge of the ice, as it were. But this may 
have been simply a historical consequence of the fact that 
many of the creative pioneers of computer science had 
accepted Turing's dream, and were struggling to make 
computers act "intelligently." It isn't true any longer, and 
many of the most exciting new ideas in computation are 
now being developed in other parts of computer science 
which have quite different aims. But it would be foolish to 
regard these methods as somehow excluded from AI. 
For example, there has been a long-standing intellectual 
struggle in machine translation between methods based on 
explicit semantic representations and those which apply 
statistical techniques to large lexical corpora. This is often 
described as a battle between AI methods and other, non-AI, 
methods. While this may be an accurate account of the 
sociology of the two sides, it makes no scientific or 
technological sense. Our aim might be to model the skill of 
human translators, or to make an effective mechanical 
translator: either way, we should not have any ad hoc 
constraints on what computational methods to use. If it works, 
or seems plausible, try it. AI has difficult enough problems 
already, without also having its technical hands tied. 
Consider again the analogy with flight. If cognitive 
psychology, psycholinguistics, etc. are like the study of natural 
flight in all its complexity, and AI is like aeronautical 
engineering, then computer science supplies the aerodynamic 
theory. The fundamental insight of cognitive science might 
be summarized by saying that computational science supplies, 
as it were, the dynamics of cognition. Just as Turing predicted 
almost half a century ago, the empirical sciences of natural 
cognition now share a computational vocabulary with the 
engineering discipline of AI. 
This picture of our field defines it in a more useful and 
more mature way than Turing could give us. AI is the 
engineering of cognition based on the computational vision 
which runs through and informs all of cognitive science. We 
expect AI to produce cognitive artifacts; things that think, 
see, communicate, plan, play and argue in some way. Perhaps 
not in a human way, but somehow useful to humans. Exactly 
what counts as "cognitive" will shift and change, and be 
altered by the science itself, just as the meaning of words 
4 Attempts to define AI in terms of its computational methods 
never work properly. For example, if AI is the study of search 
then successful learning processes automatically remove 
themselves from the discipline. 
like "energy" has been changed by physics. But ultimately, 
this doesn't matter. Turing's ultimate aim, which we can 
happily share, was not to describe the difference between 
thinking people and unthinking machines, but to remove it. 
9 Coda: The Human Condition 
Colby [1975, 1981] has argued that we should consider 
variations of the gender test, where the judge is asked to 
make different kinds of distinction. For example, the judge 
might be asked to decide which of the interrogants was really 
a child, or really an Englishman; or, in a more familiar 
example, the judge might be a clinical psychologist trying to 
diagnose which of them is really paranoid. On this view, 
Turing's choice of sex as the topic of conversation had no 
particular significance. It may have been chosen simply 
because it seems impossible to give any a priori bounds on 
the subject matter of the resulting conversation. 
However, Turing was a careful enough thinker that he 
would have suggested this diverse-topic interpretation of his 
game had this been what he had in mind, and we again 
propose to take him at face value. He seems to have chosen 
the topic of sexual identity deliberately. It is hard to avoid 
noticing that for Turing, the problem of how to convincingly 
display a sexual identity was more than just deliberately 
vague. It was a real problem at the very core of his emotional 
and social life. Turing was openly gay at a time when 
homosexuality was a crime in England and was widely 
regarded as unnatural and deviant. He was prosecuted for 
homosexuality, and avoided prison only by submitting to a 
six-month program of "rehabilitation" involving hormone 
injections which, among other things, caused his body to 
grow breasts. This bizarre and horrifying treatment is thought 
to have been part of the reason for his suicide in 1954. 
We suspect that Turing chose this topic because he wanted 
the test to be about what it really means to be human. This is 
why he has set us up in this way. He tells us, quite clearly, 
to try to make a program which can do as well as a man at 
pretending to be a woman. If we really tried to do this, we 
might be forced into thinking very hard about what it really 
means to be not just a thinker, but a human being in a 
human society, with all its difficulties and complexities. If 
this was what Turing meant, then we need not reject it as 
our ultimate goal. 
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